

MGK-A-12478

Chief, FDM
Attn: Communications
COS, Karlsruhe

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Operational

☐ Discussions at Vienna Nov. 17-19, 1949

MAV-W-1291, KARL 6968

1. The Communications aspects of staybehind planning, with particular emphasis on [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted] were discussed in considerable detail with [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted] on the occasion of [redacted]'s visit to the Vienna station 17-19 November 1949.

2. The single concrete W/T staybehind asset in Vienna at this time is []. This individual definitely requires refresher training in view of the long period of time which has elapsed since [] was last trained in W/T and related activities. It was decided to subject [] to a two weeks intensive re-training period at the earliest possible date. [] advised [] that [] could be made available o/a 28 November for this training period. Upon []'s return to Karlsruhe KARL 6968 was dispatched in order to confirm our ability to handle [] during the period in question. We anticipate training [] on our newest type agent equipment (RT-3, RR-1-B, and RP-2). In addition [] will be trained with a more secure and advanced type signal plan than the one currently held for him in Vienna. []'s additional cipher instructions, too, will be covered.

3. We desire to dig up []'s equipment cache at the earliest date practicable in order to:

A. Test SSTR-1 equipment which has been subjected to a long burial period.

B. Test the effectiveness of []'s method of solving a difficult camouflage and waterproofing problem.

C. Replace the obsolete SSTR-1 with our new type

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ABSTRACT X		INDEX

6-6-194

equipment.

4. In connection with 3C it is pointed out that we have only one each RT-3, RR-1-B, and RP-2 available to us here. This set of equipment is presently utilized for training purposes and thus we shall require the shipment of additional new type gear before we are able to implement 3C above.

5. [] continues to believe that the late World War II SSTR-1 equipment is adequate and technically satisfactory to fulfill our equipment requirements for Phase A staybehind circuits. [], however, is well organized, secure, and in general appears to be a Phase B staybehind candidate.

6. The principles of Phase "A" (initial, chaotic, first few weeks following our withdrawal from occupied Europe) and Phase "B" (the long range, enemy-occupied, police state staybehind) were discussed with officers of the Vienna station. [] believes the principles of Phase A and Phase B operation, as well as the effect resultant ramifications have on our current staybehind planning, are applicable to Austria.

7. As envisaged here personnel selected for W/T operations under Phase A would be recruited to perform duties during the chaotic initial phases of any possible conflict only. This period is variously estimated as lasting from 4-16 weeks. We believe general security conditions permit an individual possessing past W/T experience to remain active during this initial period. It is to be admitted, of course, that other factors weighed in considering and recruiting agents must be satisfied. All other factors being equal (or perhaps "acceptable" is the more appropriate word) a candidate possessing high W/T operating skill should be considered technically ideal for Phase "A" use.

8. During []'s recent TDY with us the Phase A/Phase B breakdown was discussed in considerable detail and we feel [] can verbally amplify our thinking on the matter with you at the Home Office.

9. As Armitage can explain, Phase A W/T operators would be equipped with BLUE type signal plans and, in most cases, with SSTR-1 equipment. Under Phase "A", too, we feel that a limited number of radio agents could be utilized. A radio agent is, of course, a self-sufficient intelligence entity -- a person who does his own intelligence gathering, reporting, cipher work, and W/T operating. In view of this might it not be possible to reconsider [], a reasonably well trained W/T operator as well as an apparently clever intelligence operative, for use as a radio agent under Phase A?

10. [] believes 4-6 Phase A circuits initiating from Vienna to be the maximum number of operations we could handle at our European base (presumably in the U.K.) during Phase A. [] further believes 8-10 Phase A circuits, emanating from the remainder of Austria, to be a reasonable target in the development of our planning.

11. Phase B staybehind projects should, ideally, not be activated until Phase A operations are substantially neutralized.

Direction and unilateral control of staybehinds can best be accomplished through the medium of high powered blind broadcasts.

12. The number of Phase B circuits in Austria is based more upon the question of time available to us in the selection, processing, and training of candidates than upon any numerical figure. In a sense, the greater the number of projects mounted the more effective and lasting will be our staybehind efforts. Since we can control the activation of circuits by means of blind broadcast instructions it would theoretically be possible to hold W/T circuits in reserve over a long period of time--activating additional circuits as older circuits become compromised and/or neutralized.

13. In the event that the Home Office decides to accept in whole, or in part, our recommended Phase A/B program a review of former ICEBERG candidates would appear to be in order. [] , particularly, appears to be a good prospect. [] too, has possibilities for use under the program.

14. In order to simplify the W/T training of candidates, during the early stages of such training, [] believes it desirable to issue Vienna a McElroy tape code practice set. A safe house or apartment could then be utilized, on a scheduled training period basis, to administer the many hours of initial self-practice required by each candidate in order to gain Morse code speed. When candidates, under this program, obtain a speed of 12-15 w.p.m., we can then commit an instructor for purposes of intensive W/T training. A commo trainer could install the McElroy and administer initial briefing to commence the program, of course. We must point out at this point, that additional McElroy equipment is required before we can issue Vienna one of the units. This additional equipment has already been requisitioned from the Home Office in a separate dispatch.

15. One suggestion advanced by [] was to use an Austrian to assist in the laying-on of a Phase A program. As envisaged this individual would be a mature, respected man with wide amateur and/or military radio contacts. If such a figure were used it would, of course, be requisite that we evacuate him at the time of our evacuation. Such a principle agent, however, could efficiently and in the minimum of time, lay-on a very effective Phase A program -- both as to coverage and as to security. The problem of inducement and recruitment would be materially eased since it could be placed on the basis of an Austrian appealing to a fellow Austrian. [] suggested that such a principle agent might be located through the Blue Danube Network staff or through CIC, etc.

16. It is recognized that this pouch departs from the theme set by MAV-W-1291 in a rather revolutionary manner. It is further recognized that a wide field of material is touched upon in general terms only. We have intentionally omitted a certain amount of detail which we feel Armitage can supply, verbally, at the Home Office. It must also be pointed out that [] recommends that the Home Office consider Austrian staybehind planning as part of the overall European planning in this field of activity.

17. Pending Home Office reaction to the material contained in this pouch the Commo Section here will lend all possible assistance to implementing the [] operation and to developing candidates, such as [], [], et al, who are approved for training by the Home Office.

18. [] desires to send a Commo Training Officer to Vienna in the near future in order to:

A. Dig up and test at least one of the buried ICEBERG sets.

B. Deliver, install, and brief Vienna staff personnel in the use of McElroy Morse code training equipment.

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